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Abstract 
We identify two aspects of selective inference as major obstacles for replicability: (1) 
The practice of highlighting a subset of statistical results without taking into 
consideration the multiple comparisons made in the analysis from which they were 
selected; (2) the file-drawer effect – the tendency to only publish statistically significant 
results. We propose to address the first issue by controlling the FDR using the 
hierarchical Benjamini-Hochberg procedure of Benjamini and Bogomolov. To address 
the second issue, we propose constructing confidence intervals and estimators that are 
conditioned on passing a threshold level of statistical significance. We apply our 
proposed methodologies to the 100 experimental psychology studies for which 
replication was tested as part of the Reproducibility Project in Psychology (RPP). We 
showed that these two simple-to-use tools can enhance the replicability of published 
findings without sacrificing statistical power, and are essential even when adhering to 
alternative methods proposed for addressing the replicability crisis in psychology.  
 
Introduction 
In recent years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of papers 
addressing the problem of replicability in a larger number of scientific fields, biology, 
medicine, social sciences and even computer sciences being just a handful of examples 
(Fanelli 2009; Peng 2011; Prinz et al. 2011; Gelman & Loken 2013; Achenbach 2015; 
Baker 2016; Lithgow et al. 2017; Frank et al. 2017; Nosek & Errington, 2017). Psychology 
is one of the first academic fields where the replicability problem has received 
significant attention (Smith 1970). This could possibly be attributed to the echo 
psychological discoveries have in the general public (Vanpaemel et al. 2015; Gertler et 
al. 2018; Anvari & Lakens, 2019). When discussing replicability, we adopt the arguably 
most common definition first proposed by Sir Ronald Fisher, where replication is 
considered successful if both the replication study's and the original study's p-values 
are smaller than 0.05, with an effect in the same direction. In six of the major replication 
projects undertaken in psychology in recent years, 90 of the 190 replication attempts 
were deemed "successful" (Klein et al. 2014, 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; 
Ebersole et al. 2016; Camerer et al. 2016, 2018). One such experiment is the 
Reproducibility Project in Psychology (RPP). The RPP, which was conducted by the 
Open Science Collaboration, started in 2011 and was published in 2015. In this study, 
several research groups have attempted to replicate the results of 100 papers 
published in 2008 in three Psychological journals: Psychological Science (PSCI), Journal 
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of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP), and Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition (JEP: LMC). Out of the 100 replications attempted in 
the study, only 39 successfully replicated the main result of the original experiment. 
We note that some criticisms have been leveled at the RPP regarding the extent to 
which the methods of the original experiments were followed (Stroebe 2016, Gilbert et 
al. 2016), and regarding Fisher’s definition of replication which was used in the study 
(Goodman et al. 2016).  
 
The publication of false-positive results has obvious negative implications on the study 
of Psychology. One concern is that the larger number of false results will inhibit trust 
in the scientific process.  Another, possibly worse concern, is that false discoveries often 
lead to future research, wasting valuable time and money as well as masking true 
discoveries. One example of such lasting negative effects of false positives on the 
course of research can be found in the "Disfluency engages analytic processing" effect 
of Alter et al. 2007. Participants in a hard-to-read-font experimental condition solved 
more moderately difficult syllogisms correctly than participants in an easy-to-read-font 
condition. This paper has been cited 862 times (as of November 2019), and was 
followed by hundreds of studies seeking to expand on this line of research. In the 
original experiment, four p-values were reported without adjustment for multiple 
comparisons. After adjustment, the original result (t(39)=2.01, p = 0.026) is not 
statistically significant. Attempts to replicate this result in over 70 labs, with a combined 
2580 subjects, were unsuccessful (Klein et al. 2018). Yet, this effect is still being studied: 
104 studies cited this effect in 2018 alone. It seems then that it is easier to re-discover 
a false negative than to un-discover an interesting false positive. 
 
One phenomenon which is often identified as a possible cause for a large number of 
apparent false discoveries uncovered in replication studies is publication bias. 
Publication bias stems from the tendency of editors to publish results that are 
statistically significant only. This has the effect of disincentivizing researchers from 
submitting studies that did not reach statistical significance for publication (the file-
drawer effect, Rosenthal 1979). One way to examine the extent of the publication bias 
is by examining the proportion of experiments that are being tested but lack statistical 
significance and therefore, usually, are not submitted. Registered reports are papers 
that are submitted for review before the data collection starts, and once accepted, will 
be published regardless of the results. This can help us to estimate the extent of the 
publication bias. Allen & Mehler (2019) found that 54.5% of the n = 143 registered 
reports do not yield statistically significant results and would not have been submitted 
for review if it was not done pre-data collection (the 95% CI was [46%-63%]). This 
suggests that there are more results that are not even submitted for review than 
submitted ones. Several attempts have been made to address the publication bias in 
recent years, some by requiring pre-registering throughout science, others by 
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advocating for doing away with the threshold altogether (e.g., Wasserstein et al. 2019). 
A third approach is to statistically adjust the p-values, estimates and confidence 
intervals via conditioning on passing the publication threshold. Methods for computing 
such conditional p-values were first proposed in the context of Meta-Analysis (Hedges 
& Olkin, 1985; Iyengar & Greenhouse, 1988). Conditioning the confidence intervals 
have been proposed more recently (see for example Weinstein et al. 2013, and 
Rosenblatt & Benjamini 2014). In comparative studies such as the RRP, where results 
are summarized by effect-sizes, these methodologies can be generalized and applied 
to the non-centrality parameters (NCP's) of test-statistics, which quantify the deviation 
of the observed results from the null and serve as the basis for power calculations. 
  
Publication bias is only one manifestation of the more general problem of selective 
inference affecting replicability. While this issue is hidden from the readers in tried-
and-failed attempts, the selective inference is hidden in plain sight. Multiple statistical 
tests that are reported along with those who are not reported, but are evident from 
the text, tables, and figures. Researchers emphasize the statistically significant results 
in their studies by publishing their full details, starring them, or discussing them in the 
Abstract and Discussion, while results that are not significant are only partially reported, 
or relegated to online supplementary materials. Such selective inference and reporting 
is unavoidable in the current ‘industrialized’ way science is conducted, where new 
technologies for data generation (computerized system, fMRI, genomics, etc.), data 
storage, and computing software, led to an increase in the number of statistical tests 
and inferences conducted in a single study. Testing a large number of hypotheses in a 
single study without adjustment increases the risk of making false-positive discoveries 
(Simmons et al. 2011). Multiple comparisons can be addressed in a straight forward 
manner by using multiple comparisons procedures. Unfortunately, this aspect of 
selective inference has received very little attention in the discussion regarding the 
replicability crisis. We propose to account for multiple testing by controlling the False 
Discovery Rate (FDR). Procedures such as the well-known BH procedure (Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995), accounts for multiple comparisons by keeping the expected number 
of false-positive discoveries as a proportion of all discoveries under a pre-specified 
desired level. Here we use the hierarchical FDR controlling procedure of Benjamini & 
Bogomolov 2014, which exploits hierarchical structures in multiple comparisons, that 
is common in experimental psychological studies, in order to gain power and relevance 
while maintaining a desired FDR.  
 
We exemplify our approach using the study of Schnall et al. (2008), “With a clean 
conscience”.  This study aimed to answer the question: "does priming for cleanliness 
affect the response?". Subjects were randomly divided into a primed for cleanliness 
group and a control group, presented with six moral dilemmas, and asked to grade 
how these dilemmas made them feel with respect to 10 different emotions. A group 
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mean score was also calculated for all dilemmas. The researchers used two priming 
methods: verbal & physical, in two separate experiments. Thus, the study had 2 X 10 X 
7 = 140 evident comparisons (two priming methods, ten emotions, six moral dilemmas 
and the group mean score). The authors only reported on six p-values, all six 
statistically significant. All of the tests were conducted at the 0.05 significance level 
without any adjustment for multiple comparisons. The conclusion of the study was that 
the findings support the idea that moral judgment is affected by priming for 
cleanliness. Given the 140 possible comparisons, the expected number of falsely 
rejected hypotheses (if there is no effect at all) was 7, so doubt should be cast on the 
statistical significance of these results. The RPP replication attempt of this study failed, 
and a second attempt with a larger number of subjects (126 as opposed to the original 
43, Johnson et al. 2014) also failed. 
 
Research question 
Is part of the RPP disappointing replicability results due to ignoring selective inference 
(mostly, multiple comparisons)? If the answer is in the affirmative, selective inference 
must be addressed in every report of research results in order to enhance their 
replicability. 
 
Methods 
 
The False Discovery Rate (FDR) 
Known as post-hoc analysis, psychologists are very familiar with the need to address 
multiple comparisons between various levels of a factor or to address unplanned linear 
comparisons and of traditional methods to address it. These methods control the 
probability of making even one type I error, or constructing even one confidence 
interval that does not cover the parameter of interest. The use of these methods comes 
with a major degradation of power. A different approach has been offered by Benjamini 
and Hochberg (1995), who proposed the False Discovery Rate (FDR) as an appropriate 
yet more lenient goal when encountering multiple inferences. The false discovery 
proportion is the proportion of errors among the discoveries made (0 if none is made), 
and the FDR is its expectation. In the context of testing, controlling the FDR at the 0.05 
level maintains that on average only 5% of results deemed "statistically significant" will 
be false positives. Regular unadjusted testing fails to guarantee it, so Benjamini & 
Hochberg have introduced the BH procedure for controlling the FDR at a desired level 
q (also known as α, usually 0.05). Starting by sorting m p-values P(1) ≤ P(2) ≤ … ≤ P(m). 
Choosing the largest p-value for which p(i)  ≤ q ∙
i
m
 and rejecting all consecutive smaller 
p-values (full description of the method can be found in the supplementary materials). 
If many true results are evident (i.e., many p-values ≤ q) the method is almost as 
unadjusted testing; if merely one exists, to prove it one needs an evidence as strong as 
the traditional Bonferroni, namely α/m. This makes sense since while Inspecting 100 
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features, two false discoveries among 50 discovered is bearable. Two false ones out of 
four is unbearable. Furthermore, in equivalence to the p-value, one can define the FDR-
adjusted p-value (sometimes called q-value) to be compared with any desired level. 
The approach and procedure, with the many variations introduced later, have gained 
extensive usage in many scientific fields. Later work has further extended this approach 
to confidence intervals (Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2003). 
 
Hierarchical FDR 
However, the BH procedure does not exploit any inferential structure among the tested 
hypotheses in more complex studies. For example, consider Goschke & Dreisbach 
(2008), which was replicated in the RPP, in which subjects had to notice rare prospective 
memory cues. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of this paper. There were three 3-way 
ANOVAs in this paper, each designed to support a different hypothesis (not completely 
de-similar from one another, but rather interchangable in meaning). Each of the 3-way 
ANOVAs tested in principle three main effects, three 2-way interactions, and one 3-
way interaction. Seven hypotheses in total for each 3-way ANOVA. As the study reports, 
rare prospective memory cues were overlooked more often on non-compatible trials 
than on compatible trials, and between task relevance and irrelevance. The replication 
target was a 2-way interaction between the two, F(1, 38) = 6.21, p=0.0172. In this case, 
using the naive BH procedure (i.e., adjusting for the 21 tests done in this paper) would 
not yield a significant result. Needless to say, traditional post-hoc methods would also 
not yield a significant result.  
Benjamini & Bogomolov (2014) proposed a hierarchical testing procedure that controls 
a relevant generalization of FDR and follows the structure of the inference. We have m 
(m=3) families at the first level (three 3-way ANOVAs). At the second level in each ith 
family there are nf comparisons (n1=n2=n3=7 in our example). First, one tests if there is 
at least one significant result in each branch (ANOVA), while controlling the FDR at 
level q (Simes test (1986), as an example, will fit for this type of hypothesis testing). 
Then, if k families out of the m were rejected (i.e., k discoveries), each of the k families' 
second level (interactions and main effects) is tested at the 
k
m
∙ 0.05 FDR level. In the 
study used for the example, all the families of three-way ANOVAs had at least one 
significant result, so the second level is tested at the 
3
3
∙ 0.05 level as well. Focusing only 
on the ANOVA result where replication was attempted in the RPP, the 7 comparisons 
done (3-way interaction, three 2-way interactions, & three main effects) are considered 
part of the same family of hypotheses and will be adjusted for the 7 comparisons at 
the 
3
3
∙ 0.05  level. The adjusted p-value of the targeted interaction was padj = 0.0401. 
Reassuringly, the result was replicated successfully in the RPP (full details on the 
Hierarchical BH method and the calculation of Goschke & Dreisbach example can be 
found in the supplementary materials). 
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Conditional CI 
Conditional inference methods, as their name suggests, adjust for selection by taking 
into account the conditions necessary for observing a result. For example, if we observe 
a p-value from a well-designed and carefully conducted experiment, then a small p-
value (say, p-value ≤ 0.05) is a reasonable evidence against the null. However, if we 
observe a p-value from a published study where a significance level of 0.05 was used 
as a threshold for publication, then observing a p-value smaller than 0.05 is no longer 
a surprise, but a certainty. The calculation of the CI and of an estimator of the effect 
size should take that into account. Figure 2 exemplifies the effect of conditioning in 
the case of the normal distribution. Since a result will be statistically significant at the 
0.05 level only if the absolute value of its Z-statistic is greater than 1.96,  the conditional 
distribution of published results does not include Z-statistic smaller than 1.96 in 
absolute value. As we increase the size of the effect, the probability crossing the 
threshold approaches 1, and the conditional distribution becomes more similar to the 
normal distribution. 
Figure 1: FDR tree schematic for the case of Goschke & Dreisbach (2008). Significant results at the 0.05 level after 
hierarchical BH adjustment are Bolded. PM X Comp was the target for replication in the RPP. 
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Figure 2: Z-statistic distribution (green) and conditional distribution on p ≤ 0.05 (red). Null, weak, medium, and strong 
effects μ's equal 0, 0.5, 2, and 5 respectively; all SD's equal 1; The red dashed lines represent the significance threshold. 
A confidence interval can be thought of as a set of parameters that give rise to the 
observed experimental results with a reasonably high probability. In our case, a 
conditional confidence interval will contain all parameter values (e.g., population 
means) that would yield the experimental result with a non-negligible probability given 
that the result was published (Weinstein et al. 2013; Rosenblatt & Benjamini 2014; 
Fithian et al. 2014; Benjamini & Meir, 2014; Heller et al. 2019). Notice that thresholding 
causes the mass of the conditional distribution to concentrate around threshold, 
meaning that many mean values can give rise to observed values close to the threshold, 
pulling the confidence interval towards 0 when the observed effect is close to the 
threshold (Figure 3; A full description of the method and its use in more complicated 
setting can be found in the supplementary materials). Similarly, we can obtain selection 
adjusted point estimates by maximizing the conditional likelihood in place of the 
normal likelihood. We note that in the presence of selection, the conditional maximum 
likelihood estimator for the mean will no longer be the observed mean. The conditional 
estimate acts as an adaptive shrinkage estimator, shifting towards 0 when near the 
threshold, and equaling the observed effect size when it is large. 
Normal distribution 
Conditional distribution 
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Figure 3: Conditional confidence interval plots for effect size 
?̅?
𝜎
 for the case of n=25 and 4 different Z-scores. Dashed blue 
lines represent the naïve CI. Red lines represent the Conditional CI. Triangles represent the Naïve MLE while green circles 
represent the conditional MLE. The horizontal line is the null. Each pair of CIs represents a different observed Z and effect 
size. The two left results become not significant using the conditional CI method (i.e., conditional CI covers the null).  
 
The reproducibility project in psychology (RPP) 
Both methods were used on the data from the reproducibility project. The conditional 
CI calculation was calculated based on the original result of each experiment. The 
hierarchical BH procedure, however, is dependent on more than the p-value itself. In 
the supplementary materials there are detailed reports of the hierarchical BH 
calculations for each experiment. While there were very few papers that did adjust for 
selection, if the original paper did adjust for multiple comparisons, then there was no 
need for a second adjustment. Out of the 100 replication attempts, one study did not 
publish the statistical results, one original result was replicated twice, one result was 
achieved by using a cross-classified multilevel model which prevented a calculation of 
the conditional CI, 3 replications were attempts at achieving p > 0.05, and seven studies 
had an original result of p > 0.05 (although reported and attempted to be replicated 
as statistically significant). All 13 were set aside (detailed in the supplementary 
materials). The remaining 87 original results were analyzed. 
 
Results 
For each paper in the RPP, a calculation was made for the number of evident tests in 
the paper (see example by Schnall et al. 2008, in the Introduction). The number of 
evident tests ranged from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 730, averaging 77.7 with 
SD of 95.7. However, not all inferences in a paper should be considered as one family, 
as many papers include several experiments. Instead, for each result being a target for 
replication, we identified the relevant family of inferences that are evident in the paper, 
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either explicitly being directly reported, reported as done with no detailed results, or 
indirectly mentioned and inferred. The relevant multiple comparisons adjustment was 
done only for this family. Only 12 of the papers replicated in the RPP reported any 
multiple comparisons adjustments. All 12 were only adjusted for a post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons.  
 
Using only the FDR-controlling procedure (Hierarchical BH) at the 0.05 adjusted 
threshold, yielded the results given in table 1a. On the other hand, using only the 
conditional CI method yielded the results given in table 1b. 
(a) Replicability and multiple 
comparisons adjustment 
Replicated 
Yes No 
Statistically significant (p ≤ .05)  
after hierarchical BH adjustment 
Yes 30 36 
No 1 20 
 
(b) Replicability and publication bias  
adjustment 
Replicated 
Yes No 
Conditional CI is not covering 
the null hypothesis 
Yes 20 16 
No 11 40 
Table 1: Replication before and after FDR adjustment for selective inference (a) and before and after addressing publication 
bias by conditioning on p ≤ .05 (b). The success of a replication is assessed conservatively by whether p ≤ .05 in the 
replication study. For (a): 𝜒2(1, 𝑛 = 87) = 11.50, 𝑝 = .0007, 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑗 = .001. For (b): 𝜒
2(1, 𝑛 = 87) = 10.63, 𝑝 = .001,
𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑗 = .001. Adjustment for multiplicity was made using the BH procedure. 
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A mosaic plot was drawn, combining both methods (figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Mosaic plot of RPP. This mosaic plot is a visualization of a 3-dimensional table: replication (successful or not) X 
Hirarachiel BH adjusted p-value (q) X null coverage of the conditional CI; "(-0-)" represents the null is covered by the 
conditional CI, "(--) 0" represents the null is not covered by the conditional CI; The numbers represent the frequencies; On 
the Replicated axis, squares a, b, & c represents the replicable results while d, e & f represent the non-replicable results; 
On the TreeBH axis, squares a & d represents a statistically not significant results after hierarchical BH adjustment, b, c, e, 
& f represents a statistically significant results after hierarchical BH adjustment; On the condCI axis, squares a, c, d, & f 
represents a conditional CI that cover the null, b & e represents a conditional CI that doesn't cover the null.  
 
Results that both methods found as interesting (i.e., were statistically significant after 
multiple comparisons adjustments and their conditional CI did not cover the null) were 
65% of the replicable results (20 out of 31 results; fig 4: b out of a, b, & c) while 
maintaining a replicability rate of about 55% (20 out of 36 were replicated; fig 4: b out 
of b & e). On the other hand, a result that at least one of the methods did not find as 
statistically interesting, replicated only 22% of the time (11 out of 51; fig 4: a & c out 
of a, c, d, & f). 
 
Discussion 
The adjustment made in order to address the multiple comparisons that are evident in 
the paper has shown to reduce the replicability problem dramatically: Only 1 out of 21 
results that were not statistically significant after BH adjustment was replicated 
successfully (table 1a). Strangely enough, the concern about post hoc analysis when 
reporting on pairwise comparisons or contrasts in ANOVA is well represented in 
experimental psychology, but the more global concern is ignored. Here, we showed 
that when the adjustment encompasses every comparison evident in the study, even if 
not explicitly presented, more of the results remain replicable. Moreover, adjusting for 
false discovery rate with the hierarchical approach, one can enhance the replicability of 
20 
16 
20 f 
e d 
b 
c 
1 
a
v 
10 
20 
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results without giving up much on power (one out of the 30 replicated results was not 
significant after the adjustment, table 1a). Interestingly, for ten studies that did not 
replicate, the replication protocols were “not endorsed” by original authors, and new 
replication efforts have been planned and pre-registered to test if any failed 
replications can be explained due to poor replication design (Ebersole et al. 2020). For 
9 of these 10 suspected results, the BH adjusted p-value did yield a statistically 
significant result. So, if some of these 9 will be replicated, the above results will be even 
stronger. 
These results show that reporting unadjusted "significant" p-values that would not pass 
the significance threshold if they were adjusted, is not only fallacious but amounts to 
deceiving the readers, as adjusted statistical results that are not significant rarely 
replicate. result. We, therefore, recommend that the usual way of reporting p-values 
should always be amended with exact adjusted p-values. Since the multiplicity 
adjustment should consider the entire body of results, the method chosen (e.g., BH, 
Hierarchical BH, Bonferroni, or other methods) can be specified once in the method 
section and only “padj = .012” should be added to the common way of reporting of 
statistical results (see example in the description of table 1). 
 
As to the adjustment for publication bias, it has shown to reduce the replicability 
problem even more. From Table 1b it is evident that the conditional CI, when used for 
rejection, achieved better results than the hierarchical BH: 20 out of the 36 nulls 
rejected by the conditional CI were replicated (56%) while 30 out of the 66 rejected by 
the hierarchical BH procedure were replicated (45%).  However, this result comes with 
a dramatic loss of power (only 20 of the 31 replicated results were discovered, as 
opposed to 30 out of 31 using the hierarchical BH method). In addition, the conditional 
CIs when used for testing cannot become the criterion for publication, since we shall 
then have to condition on passing this much lower bound, resulting in an ever-
increasing restrictive criterion for publication, and no power at all. 
Hence, our proposal is not to replace the CI with the conditional CI as the main result 
of an experiment, but rather to add this tool to help evaluate the importance of the 
effect, in view of the adjusted information it offers about the size of the effect. 
 
Isn’t it the p-value’s fault? 
Most scientific research have been making use of significance testing (based on P-
value) as a decision tool to determine the statistical significance of the experiment's 
results. It is therefore natural that general questionable research practices (QRPs) that 
are blamed for the crisis were mostly related to the use of p-values, and this, in turn, 
led to an attack on the concept of the p-value itself. The attack, stirred by some 
psychological journals (Trafimow & Marks, 2015; Lee 2016; Amrhein et al. 2019) and 
conducted in leading scientific and non-scientific venues, roused a formal statement 
by the American Statistical Association (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). Although it did not 
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rule out the use of p-value, it was very cautious about its use and recommended 
alternative measures, including confidence intervals, likelihood ratios, and Bayesian 
methods. Unfortunately, the use of alternative methods does not offer an advantage 
over the p-value in minimizing this problem (Savalei & Dunn, 2015). In particular, to 
reach a conclusion about an effect, checking whether a 95% confidence interval covers 
the null or not is equivalent to the use of p-value ≤ 0.05, although it is proposed as an 
"alternative" (Benjamini 2016). Hence, the proper use of CI requires it to be adjusted 
for selection (Benjamini & Yekutieli, 2005). However, the use of multiple CI adjustment 
is almost non-exitance in the field of psychology, and the move toward unadjusted CI 
instead of the p-value might increase the replicability problem. 
The p-value should remain as a central inference tool, as it is the most assumptions-
free statistical tool, and these minimal assumptions hold for well-designed 
experiments.  This recognition is evident even among the participants of a follow-up 
effort by ASA leaders convened under the heading “Statistics in the 21st century: a 
world beyond p ≤ 0.05” (Wasserstein et al. 2019). About half of the 43 lecturers did 
find a role for the p-value, and some even emphasized its vital role. Indeed, they shifted 
to objection to the use of any “bright line” threshold in scientific decision making (for 
example, p ≤ 0.05). Interestingly, the exact p-values and the p-values adjusted for 
selection presented in this paper, require no pre-assigned threshold; They can be 
compared with any level the reader wishes to use. In contrast, to construct a confidence 
interval (whether frequentist or Bayesian), one has to specify a threshold (say 95% 
confidence) and the displayed interval is bound by this threshold. Offering confidence 
intervals as a way of avoiding a threshold is illogical.  
 
General questionable research practices (QRPs) mentioned above include research 
practices such as p-hacking (Simmons et al. 2011), hypothesizing after the results are 
known (HARKing, Kerr 1998), using unfit statistical tests, optional stopping of data 
collection, manipulation of outliers, malicious exclusion of participants, post-hoc 
analysis and covariates, etc. (John et al. 2012; Button et al. 2013). Many of these are 
different names for the issue we are concerned with, selective inference. In this paper, 
the focus was the selection that is evident in the paper through emphasizing significant 
ones (*,**, etc.), highlighting a few by inclusion in the abstract, in a table, or a figure. 
The selection that is not evident in the paper (like QRPs) is another serious problem 
that we do not address here, aside for publication bias. In any case, it is important to 
emphasize that questionable research practices in general and those that concern 
selection after viewing the data are not limited to the p-value. For example, a move to 
a Bayesian-based decision making will ultimately lead to Bayes-hacking and Bayesian 
hypothesizing after the results are known (BARKing). 
  
Open Science and Pre-registration have been proposed as the other leading solutions 
for the replicability crisis. The fact that we do not address these solutions in the current 
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paper does not mean we do not consider both important. Open science implies that 
the entire process of analysis from enlisting of subjects, experimental protocols, the 
raw data, the statistical analyses tried and chosen, the programs used, and the 
generation of figures, tables, and conclusions will all be transparent and open. 
Satisfying these requirements in full, allows others to reproduce the results in a paper, 
from the data gathered to published results. Such reproducible research clearly 
enhances the replicability of the study’s results. However, open science creates a 
problem concerning multiplicity. As datasets will be published, it might lead to a 
situation where a single dataset is analyzed multiple times by multiple researchers 
without proper adjustment for multiplicity. Open science must find a solution to this 
problem. 
Pre-registration requires that all the above decisions will be taken before data is even 
collected and be registered. In the extreme form of pre-registration, journals are 
encouraged to make acceptance decisions based on the promised research only. Pre-
registration is essential for mature research problems, say in the final stages of drug 
registration, or for replication experiments. Requiring researchers, reviewers, and 
publishers to conduct and assess only pre-registered analyses is like dressing the 
scientists with straitjackets as it withholds the data-driven results. Still, it does not deal 
with the problem of multiplicity. 
 
Multiple replications 
We have used Fisher’s formulation for assessing replicability, where results are required 
to be significant and consistently in the same direction in both studies. Other 
definitions of successful replication have been offered (Valentine et al. 2011; Goodman 
et al. 2016; van Aert & van Assen, 2017, 2018), including Hung & Fithian (2019) that 
also make use of a conditional argument. A different approach treats the effect of the 
studies as random. Then, either the lack of significance of the Study-by-Effect 
interaction is considered as an evidence of replicability (e.g., Crabbe et al. 1999), or the 
significance of the effect while taking into consideration the interaction is considered 
as such (Kafkafi et al. 2005). However, these approaches address replicability only after 
replication studies were conducted, and do not carry different implications about how 
to enhance the replicability of a single stand-alone study. The only exception is the 
proposal of Kafkafi et al. (2017), relying on the laboratory (study) as a random effect. It 
uses a database to estimate the laboratory-by-effect interaction, incorporating it in a 
corrected CI for the effect in the single study. The original suggestion was made in the 
field of animal behavior, and in our future work, we explore whether a similar approach 
is relevant in experimental psychology.  
 
In conclusion: the results show that addressing multiple comparisons is a necessity. 
The results also show that conditional CI can hint on a paper's replication probability 
and the likely size of the effect in future replication studies. We, therefore, propose to 
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report exact multiple comparisons adjusted p-values with multiple comparisons 
adjusted CI. We claim that reporting of unadjusted results is negligent, especially given 
the easy deployment of adjusting tools and the minor loss of power. We also suggest 
adding the Conditional CI as a more precise indicator for the effect size and replicability 
chances. We believe that addressing selective inference, and specifically multiple 
comparisons, is an easier, faster, and more efficient way of solving the replicability crisis 
than the proposed alternatives. 
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